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Introduction1
Technological  advance  has  led  to  important  changes  in 
many areas, and in the process has created new challenges 
for the regulatory activity of public bodies. One area that 
has caused particular controversy has been that of genetic 
modifications to organisms. Genetically-modified organisms 
(GMOs) have been introduced in a range of foodstuffs and 
animal feeds, leading to debates about the balance between 
the benefits and the risks associated with this technology. 
Across the world, authorities have had to make choices con-
cerning the regulation of GMOs, be it about permissions for 
industrial trials, the cultivation of GMO crops, or the authori-
sation of trade in GMO products. 
 
  In  Europe,  the  challenges  related  to  the  regulation 
of GMOs are met within the decision-making process of the 
EU. A number of legislative acts have established a regula-
tory framework for the authorisation of cultivation, import, 
use and sale of GMOs and their placing on the market as 
food or food ingredients. Within this framework, powers to 
decide on individual applications from market operators are 
delegated to the European Commission, which in turn is wor-
king with both Member State representatives through comito- 
logy  committees  and  scientific  experts,  especially  through 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
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Comitology between Political 
Decision-Making and 
Technocratic Governance: 
Regulating GMOs 
in the European Union
Thomas Christiansen* and Josine Polak**
The EU’s comitology system is generally considered to be an effective mechanism for facilitating 
efficient policy implementation while at the same time ensuring a degree of Member State 
control  over  the  process.  However,  if  this  assessment  is  applicable  to  most  areas  of  routine 
decision-making, the regulation of GMO authorizations by the European Commission, which also 
falls under comitology, presents a markedly different picture. The article shows the particular 
problems  that  occur  in  this  field,  outlining  the  involvement  of  a  number  of  different  actors 
(comitology committees, Council, European Commission and the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) and their interaction in what has become a complex and protracted policy process. The 
articles identifies a number of key issues – the reliance of the Commission on EFSA’s scientific 
expertise, the weakness of political accountability due to divisions among the Member States, the 
difficulties of the European Commission to achieve compliance with European and international 
rules – and discusses the impact that these have on the legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy-making in this area. The article concludes that, due to the problems arising from the 
particular arrangement of interests and procedures in this area, the operation of comitology in the 
regulation of GMOs is highly problematic.  This article looks at the operation of comitology in the 
area of GMO authorisations. This area is interesting, given 
that  in  the  regulation  of  GMOs  comitology  constitutes 
a  forum  for  the  deliberation  of  a  highly  politicised  issue, 
on  which  the  Member  States  are  often  deeply  divided. 
At the same time, it is a highly technical issue, and comito-
logy provides for detailed procedures of administrative and 
technocratic governance in the European Union. We seek to 
illustrate the difficult issues arising in this context: in dele-
gating powers concerning the authorisation of GMOs to the   
European Commission, the EU’s legislative institutions have 
not only passed on technical decisions to the EU’s executive 
and scientific experts. To a large extent, this delegation of 
powers also implies that de facto it is the European Commis-
sion that has the final say on the shape of EU policy regarding 
GMOs, as Member States are divided among themselves and 
therefore not able to muster the qualified majority in Council 
that would be required to block the Commission’s proposed 
authorisations. The Commission, in turn, relies heavily in its 
decision-making on the scientific opinions provided by the 
experts in EFSA. 
  Even such a brief summary of the state of play regarding 
GMO regulation in the EU highlights two points: first, this is 
a very complex area of EU regulatory governance in which 
predictions  about  policy-outcomes  are  hazardous;  and, 
second, there is a very peculiar balance between techno-
cratic governance and political decision-making. This article 
seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between technical expertise and political decision-
making in this particular field, and thereby to illuminate the 
functioning of comitology in a crucial area of EU regulatory 
governance.
  In order to do so, we first elaborate briefly in the following 
section the functioning of the comitology system in gene-
ral, before then discussing the regulatory framework for the 
authorisation of GMOs and the respective involvement of the 
European Commission, Member States’ representatives and 
scientific experts in more detail. We illustrate the decision-
making process of GMO authorisations by looking at one 
individual case in more detail. We then analyse this situation 
by examining a number of key issues arising from the discus-
sion: firstly, the demands concerning risk regulation that the 
EU decision-making procedure has to address; secondly, the 
degree of political control that is being exercised over Euro-
pean officials and scientific experts to whom powers have 
been delegated in the GMO area; and thirdly, the challenges 
concerning legitimacy and effectiveness of GMO regulatory 
activity that arise from the this situation. By way of conclu-
sion, we assess the state of play of GMO regulation against 
the background of the preceding analysis, and look ahead to 
the future challenges in this area. 
Comitology in Practice: The Case of GMOs
Before looking in greater detail at the specific area of GMO 
authorisation in the EU, we first need to take a brief look at 
the nature of comitology more generally. The development 
of this system of implementing committees has been the 
focus of a growing body of literature2 which has established 
the historical trajectory and key issues involved. Comitology 
was  an  ad  hoc  solution  in  the  1960s  to  assist  with  the 
implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The  delegation  of  powers  to  the  Commission  and  the 
supervision of the Commission’s use of these powers through 
committees  composed  of  Member  States’  representatives 
was considered a convenient mechanism to satisfy both the 
search for greater efficiency and the desire by Member States 
to maintain a degree of control over the process. 
  Since then, comitology has gone through a number of 
reforms aimed at making procedures more systematic and 
transparent, but above all to allow the European Parliament, 
as co-legislator in most of EU law, a degree of oversight about 
the  way  implementing  committees  work.  With  the  most 
recent reform of the Comitology Decision in 2006, introduc-
ing a new ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’, the Parliament   
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now has the power to veto implementing acts proposed by 
the Commission under this procedure. 
  The comitology system has expanded significantly over 
time. Iit now encompasses approximately 264 committees3 
and the European Commission is adopting on average more 
than 2500 implementing acts that have first gone through 
comitology. Despite the administrative burdens associated 
with this process, the system appears to function smoothly, 
with the Commission able to adopt more then 99 per cent 
of the implementing measures submitted to committees. 
Given how few cases are being referred to the Council un-
der the management and regulatory procedures, the comi-
tology system appears to satisfy its dual role of providing 
efficiency and ensuring a degree of Member State control 
over the process of implementation.4
  However, while this is the general picture of comitology 
that is reflected both in the official reports issued annually 
by the Commission and by the academic literature on the 
subject,  we  are  interested  here  in  what  happens  in  the 
fraction of cases where the Commission is at least initially 
blocked from implementing the proposed measures – which 
is the area of authorising GMO products. More specifically, 
we intend to look at the functioning of the system concer-
ning the authorisation of GMOs to be placed on the market 
under  Regulation  1829/2003/EC  on  genetically  modified 
food and feed. 
  Rapid technological changes within the field of GMOs 
require  decisions  on  this  issue  to  be  taken  swiftly  and 
efficiently,  and  the  comitology  system  –  designed  with 
precisely the intention of speeding up EU decision-making 
on technical issues – is in theory well suited to deal with this 
issue. However, what may be observed within this area is that 
the relevant regulatory committee involved – the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH),5   
Section on ‘Genetically Modified Food and Feed and Environ-
mental Risk’ – is consistently unable to deliver opinions on the 
Commission’s  draft  decisions  regarding  authorisation  of 
GMOs to be placed on the market. As a matter of fact, an 
examination of the relevant voting records suggests that the 
committee did not manage to deliver an opinion on any of 
the fifteen draft decisions for authorisation submitted by the 
Commission since the establishment of this committee in 
2002,6  either because the required qualified majority could 
not be achieved or due to a lack of any vote taken before the 
expiry of the proscribed time period. The reason for this state 
of affairs is not so much that the Member States as a whole 
disagree with the Commission on this issue, but rather that 
there are divisions among the Member States which make it 
virtually impossible to achieve a qualified majority either in 
favour or against the authorisation of GMO foods.
  Under the regulatory procedure that is being applied in 
these cases, the absence of an opinion either way means 
that dossiers regarding the authorisation of GMOs under this 
Regulation are referred to the Council. This in turn implies a 
prolongation of a procedure that, as mentioned before, was 
originally designed to enhance the efficiency of EU decision-
making.  However,  swift  decision-making  is  then  compro-
mised further as the divisions on this issue also proliferate 
within the Council itself.7 Opinions on the matter of GMOs 
are not only fairly evenly divided among the Member States, 
but are also politically charged, with most actors set in rather 
entrenched positions on this matter. As a result, the Coun-
cil is not in a position to overrule the European Commission 
(something that would again require a qualified majority) 
which means that ultimately the decisional responsibility 
regarding authorisation reverts back to the Commission. At 
the end of the day, therefore, it is the European Commission 
which is finally taking the decision on application authori- 
sing GMOs to be placed on the market,8 even though these 
are never endorsed by a qualified majority of the Member 
States. 
  This state of affairs raises serious questions about the 
accountability of EU governance; to put it bluntly, it implies 
that the more controversial implementation in a given area 
of EU decision-making is, the more likely it is, in the end, that 
regulatory decisions are taken by the European Commis-
sion – an unelected body that actually relies heavily on the 
advice it receives from a decentralized agency such as EFSA 
in coming to its own decisions. Before exploring in greater 
depth  the  wider  implications  of  this  state  of  affairs,  the 
following section will briefly illustrate the actual process of 
implementation in the case of one particular application for 
the authorisation of a new, genetically-modified maize with 
the official name ‘MON863’. 
  The MON863 ‘story’ started in July 2002, when Monsanto 
Europe S.A. filed an application with the relevant authority 
in Germany requesting authorisation to place on the mar-
ket its genetically modified maize line MON863. The respec-
tive German authority then conducted an assessment study 
on its safety9 and presented an initial assessment report – 
indicating that additional assessment was needed – to the 
Commission’s Directorate-General of Health and Consumer 
Protection  (DG  SANCO)  in  April  2003.10  The  Commission 
subsequently  circulated  the  report  amongst  the  relevant 
competent authorities of all Member States, following which 
they communicated their comments on this report to the 
Commission.
  As a matter of fact, several Member States raised objec-
tions regarding a potential authorisation in this case. The 
subsequent informal conciliation phase resulted in dead-
lock as several Member States maintained objections, and 
the Commission consequently requested a risk assessment 
opinion  from  EFSA.  Following  the  conclusion  of  this  risk 
assessment  study,  EFSA’s  GMO  Panel  came  in  April  2004 
to  the  conclusion  that  MON863  was  safe.11  However,  the 
subsequent  circulation  by  the  German  authority  of  an 
evaluation report questioning some aspects of a study car-
ried out by Monsanto for the authorisation of MON86312 
compelled the Commission to refer the case to the EFSA 
again so that it could conduct a retrospective evaluation 
of the data derived from the study. This evaluation resulted in 
a re-confirmation that “the placing on the market of MON 863 
maize is unlikely to have an adverse effect on human and   
animal health or the environment in the context of its pro-
posed use”.13 Based on these consecutive positive scientific 
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eopinions from EFSA, the Commission then submitted in May 
2005 its draft decision to authorise the placing on the mar-
ket of MON863 to the SCFCAH for discussion and voting.14
  However, as suggested above, the vote in the SCFCAH 
did not deliver a qualified majority either in favour or against 
the draft15 and the matter was now referred to the Environ-
ment Council. The subsequent lack of a qualified majority 
either for or against the authorisation in Council in Octo-
ber 2005 meant that the matter now returned to the Com-
mission, allowing it to adopt its original proposal after all. 
In January 2006, despite a further critical report on the safe-
ty of MON863,17 written parliamentary questions regarding 
the alleged shortcomings of the Monsanto study referred to 
earlier,18 a simple majority of Member States in the Environ-
ment Council being against authorisation,19 and a negative 
public  attitude  towards  GMOs  in  general,20 the  Commis-
sion nevertheless went on to adopt Decision 2006/68/EC 
authorising the placing on the market of foods and food 
ingredients derived from MON863.21
GMO Authorisation: The Challenge for Comitology
The way in which the authorisation process unfolded in this 
case stirred up a broader debate that focused on the virtues 
of science-based regulation as well as on the merits of the 
comitology  regulatory  procedure  within  the  specific  area 
of GMO regulation. It demonstrated that, while the comito-
logy procedures seem to work extremely well for routine 
decision-making,  there  might  be  problems  in  those  rare 
cases like GMO authorisation where the issue is politicised 
and  Member  States’  positions  are  divided. The  following 
section examines more closely the key issues at stake: the 
challenges  to  risk  regulation  under  conditions  of  relative 
uncertainty;  the  degree  of  political  control  that  is  being 
exercised over technocrats and scientific experts; the rela-
tionship between the European Commission and a scien-
tific advisory body such as EFSA; and more generally the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms in an 
area such as this.
The Role of Experts regarding the Regulation 
of ‘Uncertain Risks’
One  of  the  focal  points  in  this  context  concerns  the 
high degree of reliance on scientific expertise within this 
particular area of risk regulation. The significant role of such 
expertise derives not only from the nature of the subject-
matter,  but  also  from  the  legislative  framework  itself.  EU 
legislation  stipulates  that  Commission  decisions  regard-
ing authorisation “have to be based on risk assessment”22 
and has clearly defined the subject of GMO regulation as   
“an expert scientific issue... kept separate from socio-ethical 
issues”.23
  However,  the  reliance  of  those  charged  with  the  re-
sponsibility  for  risk  management,  the  European  Commis-
sion, on those responsible for risk assessment, the scientific 
GMO Panel at the EFSA, is further magnified: although the 
Commission is formally only expected to “[take] into account 
the opinion of the [EFSA]”,24 it has turned out in practice to 
be virtually impossible for it to deviate from this opinion. 
The justifications for diverging from such an opinion “must 
be of a scientific level at least commensurate with that of 
the opinion in question”,25 and the Commission simply does 
not command the resources to provide the strong scien-
tific basis for an objection that would be legally required. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that in every single case where 
a GMO authorisation was at stake, the Commission proposed 
to approve the placing on the market of the GMO product in 
line with the EFSA’s opinion. As a matter of fact, this state 
of affairs serves as an apt illustration of the de facto centre-
stage position that EFSA has in this regulatory process.
  The  need  for  scientific  expertise  in  the  regulation  of 
GMO authorisations therefore clearly leaves the European   
authorities with a dilemma: on the one hand, the Commis-
sion cannot but rely on the expertise of EFSA, but doing so 
does raise questions about the legitimacy of decisions which 
ultimately have to be taken by institutions that are politically 
accountable. A critical issue therefore is the relationship
between political decision-makers and scientific experts.
The European Commission and EFSA 
in the Regulatory Process
In the EU, the use of scientific expertise in the regulation 
of GMOs depends on the direction which Commission and 
Member  States’  representatives  have  given  to  decision- 
making in this policy-area. As pointed out previously, how-
ever,  both  the  comitology  committee  (SCFCAH)  and  the 
Council have consistently been unable to achieve a qualified 
majority regarding draft decisions for GMO authorisation. 
This has meant that decisional responsibility has always re-
verted back to the European Commission. In effect, neither 
the re-presentatives in the comitology committee nor the 
Ministers in the Council have been able to indicate the direc-
tion that member states wish to take in this process. Even if 
written parliamentary questions regarding the authorisation 
of MON863 triggered a debate on risk assessment standards 
and the role of the EFSA with the responsible Commissioner 
Kyprianou,26 the perception must be that Member States are 
actually too internally divided to provide political leader-
ship on this issue. De facto, decisions have been made by 
‘unelected bureaucrats’, following advice from independent 
scientists. Not only risk assessment, but also risk manage-
ment, has been conducted outside the political arena..
  The resulting ‘political deficit’ regarding GMO authorisa-
tions may be considered problematic for two reasons. First-
ly, the effect of it is that the Commission has de facto been 
endowed with the responsibility for adopting decisions that, 
without exception, approve the placing on the market of 
GMOs notwithstanding the political disagreements among 
the Member States in the Council and even the resistance 
to such authorisations by a (simple) majority of the nation-
al delegations in some cases (e.g. MON863). Although the 
Commission has declared that it would refrain from going 
against a “predominant position” in the Council on matters 
of sensitivity,27 the obligation in the Comitology Decision 
that  “the  proposed  implementing  act  shall  be  adopted 
by the Commission”28 makes it quite difficult, if not legally 
impossible, for the Commission to abandon its draft pro-
posals to authorise. However, given the political nature of 
8
www.eipa.eu
E
x
 
m
i
s
 
e
t
e
b
a
t
r
u
m
 
r
e
s
?
 
C
e
r
i
d
e
s
t
 
v
i
r
i
d
e
p
s
e
n
a
 
o
m
a
x
i
m
i
l
8
C
o
m
i
t
o
l
o
g
y
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
-
m
a
k
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
c
h
n
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
ethis uncertain and highly-sensitive area of governance, the 
limited degree to which the Member States are able to lend 
direction to the process and, in contrast to that, the influence 
exerted  by  technocrats  and  scientists  –  even  if  legally 
justified – may certainly be considered contentious. 
  The  limited  effectiveness  of  political  control  is  also 
problematic because of the Commission’s performance as 
a risk manager vis-à-vis EFSA. The establishment of EFSA 
as a non-majoritarian agency was very much driven by the 
recognition of the widely accepted need to separate risk 
assessment  and  risk  management;  something  which  was 
done by explicitly denying the EFSA any regulatory powers. 
Indeed, the Commission strongly emphasised that “risk ma-
nagement must be left to an institutional framework with 
full political accountability” and insisted that “the drafting 
and making of legislation will remain the responsibility of 
the Commission, the Parliament and the Council” .
  However,  in  practice  the  Commission’s  decisions 
have largely confirmed the opinions given by the EFSA.29 
This  suggests  that  not  the  Commission,  but  rather  EFSA 
itself may in a sense be seen as the de facto risk manager. 
In the context of the regulation of uncertain risks,30 where 
risk assessment standards are subject to debate, the limited 
influence of those political institutions that are ultimately in 
charge of decision-making, may be seen as detrimental to 
the legitimacy of EU policy in this area.
 
Member State Responses 
to EU-Level Implementing Decisions
Taken together, these observations may lead to the con-
sideration that there may well be a need to re-examine the 
legitimacy potential of the existing procedure for the regu-
lation of GMOs: in a situation where sensitive, value-laden 
choices about the authorisation of GMOs are not only based 
on scientific advice, but where final decisions are indirectly 
made by an unelected body, concerns regarding the extent 
to which the current procedure makes it possible to hold 
decision-makers to account may be considered very well 
justified.
  On top of this, as already mentioned, the Commission’s 
decisions  granting  authorisation  have  to  confront  often 
substantial opposition not only from a majority of Member 
States, but indeed also large sections of the wider public 
in Europe. A number of Member States have invoked safe-
guard clauses seeking to ban the placing on the market 
of certain GMOs for which EU authorisation was granted, 
a  development  that  may  be  considered  as  an  indication 
that  the  current  practice  of  dealing  with  GMO  regula-
tions may not be the most effective mechanism to make 
policy in the face of divided opinions from Member States 
  EU  legislation  stipulates  that  for  a  national  safeguard 
measure to be justified, it must be based on “new or addi-
tional evidence” which was not taken into account for the 
original  risk  assessment  for  the  respective  GMO  product, 
and which would necessitate a review of the original scien-
tific opinion of the EFSA.31 The validity of the evidence sub-
mitted by the Member State is, upon request by the Com-
mission, assessed by the EFSA, which has without exception 
concluded that the information produced would not chal-
lenge its own prior risk assessment. Following up on such 
opinions,  the  Commission  then  submitted  proposals 
requesting  the  respective  Member  States  to  repeal  their 
provisional  safeguard  measures.  However,  it  has  been 
difficult to actually enforce the lifting of such national bans: 
the  SCFCAH  comitology  committee  has  been  unable  to 
deliver an opinion on such proposals and the Council has - in 
the large majority of cases - indicated its opposition to the 
forced lifting of national bans.32
  The repeated rejections by the Council of the proposed 
Commission measures has created difficulties: firstly, as po-
litical disagreements in the Council prevent the Commission 
from adopting proposals that are required by both EU legis-
lation and by international law, the EU is in constant violation 
of both. Secondly, this also puts the Commission in an im-
possible position: as the EFSA has consistently re-confirmed 
the safety of GMOs, the Commission could only act by re-
submitting time and again the same (or slightly amended) 
proposal requesting a Member State to lift its ban, only to 
see it subsequently being rejected by the Ministers in the 
Council. 
  The protracted nature of this process and its outcomes 
is perhaps most aptly illustrated by the Commission’s at-
tempts to force Austria, one the staunchest opponent of the 
authorisation of genetically modified crops, to open its mar-
ket for the genetically modified maize line MON810. The first 
Commission proposal requesting Austria to repeal its na-
tional safeguard measures regarding this GMO product was 
submitted to SCFCAH in November 2004. However, as the 
committee could not give an opinion on this proposal, the 
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edraft decision was referred to the Council, which, acting by 
qualified majority, in its turn rejected the proposal. Follow-
ing a re-confirmation by the EFSA of the safety of MON810, 
the Commission submitted a second draft decision to the 
Council  requesting  Austria  to  repeal  its  safeguard  meas-
ures. Upon the rejection of this proposal by the Ministers in 
December 2006 and another reconfirmation of the EFSA that 
the GMO was “unlikely to have adverse effects on human and 
animal health in the context of its proposed uses”, the Com-
mission again re-submitted its draft decision to the Council.   
However, at the Council meeting in March 2009 over twenty 
Member States voted against the Commission’s proposal, 
and  thereby  defeated  the  Commission’s  attempt  to  lift   
Austria’s  ban  for  the  third  time,  after  a  process  that  has   
already lasted for more than four years at the moment of 
writing.33
  At the same Council meeting in March, the majority of 
Ministers backed another national ban introduced by Aus-
tria, and a safeguard measure notified by Hungary which 
the  Commission  had  sought  to  get  lifted  for  the  second 
time. Proposals lifting national bans imposed by Greece and 
France have – given the absence of an Opinion in the SCFC-
AH – also been referred to the Council this spring. In case 
of further negative votes in the Council, the Commission 
might feel that it has no choice but to take the ‘recalcitrant’ 
Member States to the ECJ in order to find a solution to a very 
protracted issue. The Commission has done so once in the 
past, when the Court of First Instance, and then the Euro-
pean  Court  of  Justice,  upheld  the  Commission’s  decision 
requesting Austria to lift its general ban on genetic engi-
neering.34 
  However, if anything could be derived from this discus-
sion, it is that the Member States’ preparedness to accept 
each others’ explicit will on this sensitive issue prevails against 
their legal obligation to ensure the smooth functioning of 
the internal market and their compliance with international 
trade rules. Clearly, this broadly shared opposition amongst 
Member States to the enforced lifting of national bans puts 
in question the workability of the comitology system. This is 
an interesting addition to the earlier observation regarding 
the problems arising from the divergence of Member States’ 
positions regarding the authorisation of GMOs. In any case, 
in the light of this problem one may conclude that the ef-
fectiveness of the comitology system falls somewhat short 
of the expectations that one may have in it, both based on 
theoretical notions of its functioning and on the empirical 
record of its performance in any other area than GMOs.
Comitology and the Regulation of GMOs: 
Not a Good Match?
This analysis of the (mal)functioning of comitology proce-
dures has focused on the particular area of GMO authorisa-
tions. As we indicated at the outset, this is not a typical case – 
in fact, it is an entirely exceptional field in which the ‘normal’ 
assumptions about comitology do not seem to apply. In any 
other arena, the relation between Commission and Member 
States representatives in comitology committees works very 
smoothly, with practically no referrals to the Council and a 
cooperative, problem solving attitude dominating the pro-
ceedings. Authors have characterised the nature of this re-
lationship as ‘deliberative supranationalism’ and have even 
gone as far as seeing the evidence here for the ‘fusion’ of na-
tional and European administrative systems. 
  When it comes to GMO authorisations, however, we have 
seen how this cooperative relationship breaks down, leaving 
decision-making to be dominated by EU-level scientific ex-
perts and technocrats in EFSA and Commission. This means 
that  through  the  comitology  procedure  the  Commission 
regularly takes decisions which go against a large number 
of  Member  State  positions  (and  against  a  good  share  of 
public opinion). Individual Member States then impose uni-
lateral bans in response to Commission authorisations, and 
the Commission’s desire to get such bans lifted then results 
in protracted procedural delays and ultimately a situation of 
an uneven application of policy in the Union. 
  Given that comitology was initially designed as a mecha-
nism  to  achieve  an  efficient  implementation  of  policies, 
and that it has helped, on the whole, to engender a close and 
cooperative  working  relationship  between  national  admin-
istrations and Member States, the way in which comitology 
has (not) worked in the area of GMO authorisation points to 
the failure of delegation in this field. The comitology proce-
dure in this particular area can be seen to suffer both from a 
legitimacy deficit (due to the weak political accountability of 
decision-making) and an efficiency deficit (due to the inabil-
ity of the Commission to overcome non-compliance by the 
Member States). 
  At  the  heart  of  the  problem  is  the  fact  that  Member 
States have delegated to the Commission (and de facto to 
EFSA) a power to take decisions which a number of them are 
unwilling to accept. The delegation of such implementing 
decisions to the European Commission, and the reliance on 
independent scientific expertise, appears to be highly prob-
lematic in an area of regulating uncertain risks such as GMO 
authorisation where Member States have been unable to 
take a clear decision either in favour or against the authori-
sation of GMOs in the basic acts of EU legislation. 
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